Abdallah Elnour El Senoussi c. Canada (MCI) 2024 FC 74

In Abdallah Elnour El Senoussi c. Canada (MCI) Justice Pentney examined the Applicant’s cessation decision. The Applicant, a citizen of Chad, was granted refugee status in 2012 and secured permanent resident status in 2015. The Applicant then proceeded to travel to Cameroon on a Canadian Travel document from November 2014 to April 2015. When re-entering Canada, the Applicant was stopped by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), who discovered the Applicant to be in possession of three documents issued by Chadian authorities: 1) a 15-day absence from work authorization, dated March 6, 2025; 2) a pay slip from the Health Delegation of N’Djamena, dated October 2014; and 3) a name change document from 2004. Based on the above documents, the Minister argued that the Applicant had reavailed himself of the protection of Chad. At the hearing, the Applicant argued that the documents were placed in his suitcase without his knowledge, highlighting the inconsistencies, and stoutly denying that he returned to Chad since securing permanent residence in Canada. Even so, the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) granted the Minister’s application on the grounds of s.108(1)(a) of IRPA. On judicial review, Justice Pentney found that the RPD had erred by making a negative inference to the Applicant’s credibility based on a non-determinative point. In addition, the RPD did not meaningfully address the content of the two key documents it relied on to conclude that the Applicant worked for the government of Chad.  The decisive error was the RPD failing to explain how the Applicant could have worked in Chad in October 2014 when he only left Canada on November 15, 2014. Moreover, the RPD failed to explain how it established the authenticity of the work-absence authorization, given that the document authorized an absence in March but was issued in April. Justice Pentney found that the RPD failed to analyze the Applicant’s arguments regrading the problems with the documents. The application for leave was allowed.


Canada (MPSEP) v. Guclu 2024 FC 62

In Canada (MPSEP) v. Guclu, Justice Little assessed the Minister’s application to set aside the Immigration Appeal Division’s (IAD) decision to allow an appeal of a removal order issued against the Respondent under s.67(1)(c) of IRPA. Upon judicial review, Justice Little found the IAD’s decision to be unreasonable principally due to the reasons not being responsive to key issues raised by the Minister. The Minister had raised two specific and related issues, that were not analyzed expressly, or at all. Those issues were 1) the credibility of the Respondent and his wife (affecting several Ribic factors); and 2) the impact of the Respondent’s serious misrepresentation and lack of remorse on weight given to his establishment in Canada. These two issues were central to the Minister’s position on appeal to the IAD, and sufficiently central to the IAD’s decision as a whole, that the IAD’s failure to assess them made the decision unreasonable. The application for leave was allowed.


Bubreg v. Canada (MCI) 2024 FC 40

In Bubreg v. Canada (MCI), Justice Azmudeh reviewed the Applicant’s request for a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of a Charter challenge. The Applicant was recognized as a convention refugee in 2003. Twenty years late, the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) granted the Minister’s cessation application pursuant to s.108(1)(a) of IRPA, resulting in the Applicant losing her permanent resident status. The Applicant appealed the decision at the Federal Court on June 6, 2023, with the matter currently pending. The Applicant brought forward a motion to hold the judicial review in abeyance pending the determination of the Charter challenge in the matter of Jude Upali Gnanapragasam and Al. v. MCI and Al., Court File No.: IMM-8432-22. The applicants in Gnanapragasam were arguing that ss.40.1 and 46(1) (c.1) of IRPA (provisions that provide automatic loss of permanent residence status following a determination that refugee protection ceased under ss.108(1)(a) -(d) of IRPA) violate ss.7, 15, 12 and 2(d) of the Charter. The Federal Court Act notes that the Federal Court may, in its discretion, stay a proceeding “where for any other reason it is in the interest of justice that the proceedings be stayed.” [Par 50(1)(b)]. Justice Azmudeh found that it was in the interest of justice to grant the Applicant’s request to hold her matter in abeyance until a determination was made in Gnanapragasam. Justice Azmudeh relied on the Federal Court’s decision in Habib, 2023 FC 1116, which had the exact situation as the Applicant in the present case. In Habib, Justice Sadrehashemi put that judicial review (and nine others) in abeyance pending the outcome in Gnanapragasam. In the case at hand, Justice Azmudeh granted the Applicant’s motion and ordered that the case proceed as a specially managed proceeding under Rule 384 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106.


Meer v. Canada (MCI) 2024 FC 9

In Meer v. Canada (MCI) Justice McDonald examined the Applicant’s cessation decision. The Applicant was granted refugee status, on basis of sexual orientation, and obtained permanent residence in 2006. In 2013, the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) concluded that the Applicant did not meet the residency requirements and rejected the Applicant’s argument that he had to be in India to care for his parents. In 2019, the Minister applied to cease the Applicant’s refugee protection. The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) granted the Minister’s application on the grounds of s.108(1)(a) of IRPA. The Applicant appealed the decision at the Federal Court, arguing that the RPD erred by failing to consider both s.108(1)(a) and s.108(1)(e) of IRPA, with attention to the consequences of findings under each section. The applicant argued that the RPD had a duty to consider s.108(1)(e) of IRPA in light of the changes in circumstances towards the LGBTQ+ community in India. In Justice McDonald’s view, responsive justification required the RPD to address s.108(1)(e) of IRPA and provide reasons as to why that paragraph was or was not applicable. Even accepting that it is s.108(2) of the IRPA that grants the RPD discretion, “discretion is not a blank slate, and considering the harsh consequences as a result of a finding under paragraphs 108(1)(a) -(d), responsive justification required the RPD to, at least, address why it did not consider cessation under paragraph 108(1)(e)” (at para. 29). The Applicant also proposed a question for certification: “Where change of circumstances in the country of return is applicable, should the RPD member in a cessation hearing be required to consider the least punitive sanction first (section 108(1)(e))?” Justice McDonald found that the following question did not arise from the RPD’s decision in this case, as the RPD did not make any findings with respect to change in country conditions in India. Therefore, the question was not certified. The application for leave was allowed in part.