Cao v. Canada (MCI) 2024 FC 218
In Cao v. Canada (MCI) Justice Turley examined the Applicant’s cessation decision. The Applicant successfully claimed asylum in 2014 due to her practice of Falun Gong. The Applicant secured her Canadian permanent residence in 2016 and applied for citizenship in 2021. In her application, the Applicant disclosed travel to China in 2018 to 2019 for 93 days on her Chinese passport (which was issued prior to her seeking asylum). The Applicant renewed her Chinese passport in May 2021. Based on the Applicant’s past travel to China, the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) granted the Minister’s cessation application on the basis of reavailment. The RPD found that by travelling back to China on her Chinese passport, the Applicant had voluntarily reavailed herself of the protection of that country’s diplomatic protection.
On judicial review, Justice Turley found that the RPD erred in their application of the reavailment test. Firstly, the RPD erred in assessing the Applicant’s intent to reavail by assessing her intention on what the Applicant “should have known” about the immigration consequences of her trip, and by merging voluntariness with intent. Secondly, the RPD erred by requiring the Applicant to establish that she was “in hiding” while in China. Justice Turley found that the RPD relied on Federal Court decision, which predated Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50. Recently, Justice Ahmed considered this issue in Gorgis, 2025 FC 117 and concluded that requiring applicants to establish that they had been “in hiding” did not accord with the Galindo Camayo decision. Justice Turley agreed with Justice Ahmed’s conclusion and adopted it in the above matter. In the case at hand, the RPD’s fixation on whether the Applicant had been “in hiding” prevented it from accurately assessing the precautionary measures the Applicant did take when determining whether she had rebutted the presumption of reavailment. The application for leave was allowed.
Ababor v. Canada (MIRC) 2025 FC 208
In Ababor v. Canada (MIRC) Justice Go reviewed the Applicant’s Convention Refugee Abroad or Country of Asylum Class refusal. The Applicant was an Ethiopian citizen, born and raised in Saudi Arabia after her father fled there due to past persecution in Ethiopia. In 2014, her family moved to Egypt, where they were granted refugee status by the UNHCR. In 2016, while the Applicant was still a minor, her family had a potential resettlement opportunity in the United States, for which they completed a pre-screening interview. In 2018, her family’s request for resettlement in the United States was refused and in 2019 the Applicants submitted a resettlement application with IRCC. In 2020, the family was advised to submit a new resettlement application. As the Applicant had turned 18 at that time, she filed a separate application (even though her family was interviewed together in 2023). On January 2nd, 2024, the Applicant received a Procedural Fairness Letter (PFL), finding that she failed to disclose a “prior asylum claim” to the United States and its subsequent refusal. The Applicant responded and advised that she understood a prior “visa application” to mean one she would have applied for independently, not a resettlement process initiated by the UNHCR. The Applicant also submitted the Notice of Ineligibility for Resettlement from the US Citizenship and Immigration Services which indicated that the U.S.’s denial decision had been for “no specified reason.” On January 8th, 2024, the Officer refused the Applicant’s resettlement application.
On judicial review, the determinative issue was the Officer’s failure to consider the Applicant’s explanation for failing to disclose her family’s US resettlement application refusal. Justice Go found that while the Officer did not need to consider s.40(1)(a) of the IRPA, the Officer’s decision and justification for the refusal still had to be reasonable. When deciding to place less weight on the Applicant’s PFL response, the Officer relied on the Applicant’s lack of objection to the interpretation provided to her at the Embassy interview. This reasoning was faulty. The Applicant’s response did not attempt to shift blame on the Interpreter. In addition, while it was true that the Applicant had multiple opportunities to mention the US refusal, her explanation for this omission was that she understood she was required to mention visa applications for which she had applied for independently, not through programs facilitated by resettlement agencies, of which processes she had no knowledge. The Officer failed to address the Applicant’s explanation. Justice Go concluded that the Officer’s failure to address and assess the Applicant’s explanation was determinative to the judicial review application. The application for leave was allowed.
A.S. v. Canada (MCI) 2025 FC 199
In A.S. v. Canada (MCI) Justice Favel assessed the Applicant’s inadmissibility finding. The Applicant’s sponsorship application was refused on the basis of inadmissibility under s.34(1)(f) of the IRPA in relation to s.34(1)(d) of the IRPA. When making this decision, the Officer considered the Applicant’s membership in two groups: Aglaya and the Srivastava Group. In March 2022, the Officer sent the Applicant a Procedural Fairness Letter (PFL), finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant was a member of the Srivastava Group, playing a major supervisory and decision-making role across its various businesses. The Officer also raised concerns about the Applicant’s inadmissibility in connection with the Srivastava Group’s affiliation with a company called Aglaya. Aglaya was involved in the sale and production of surveillance and hacking tools for information warfare and signal intelligence. The Officer argued that Aglaya seemed to be an affiliate of the Srivastava Group. The Applicant submitted a lengthy response, denying, among other things, any connection to Aglaya.
On judicial review, Justice Favel found the decision to be unreasonable when it came to the analysis of the Officer’s concerns regarding Aglaya. The Applicant did not challenge the Officer’s finding of whether Aglaya’s activities amounted to a security concern under s.34(1)(d) of the IRPA. Rather, the sole issue was whether the Applicant, as Vice Chairman of the Srivastava Group, was a member of Aglaya for the purposes of s.34(1)(f) of the IRPA. The decisive issue was the sufficiency of the evidentiary basis for the finding that Aglaya was a subsidiary or affiliate of the Srivastava Group. Apart for the Applicant’s statutory declaration denying the connection, the additional evidence on record was 1) Aglaya, Srivastava Group, and the Applicant shared a physical address; 2) the Applicant and his parents operated the Srivastava Group; and 3) the CEO of Aglaya was the Applicant’s brother. Justice Favel found that the Officer failed to demonstrate an objective foundation for the finding that Aglaya was a subsidiary or affiliate of the Srivastava Group based on compelling or credible information. Thus, the membership founding was unjustified. The Application for leave was allowed.
Mohamathu Zubair v. Canada (MCI) 2025 FC 190
In Mohamathu Zubair v. Canada (MCI) Justice Go analyzed the Applicant’s Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) decision. The Applicant was a Sri Lankan citizen and Tamil Muslim, who claimed persecution from the Kattankudy police and Terrorism Investigation Division (TID) due to his suspected connection to the 2019 Easter bombings. The Applicant left Sri Lanka in March 2021. In support of his asylum claim, the Applicant put forward a Message Form dated January 10, 2021, allegedly served on his father by the Kattankudy police. The Message Form required the Applicant’s appearance on January 15th, 2021 as he had failed to show up for a prior date. During the asylum hearing, the Minister provided evidence from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), which indicated that the CBSA had made a request of the Kattankudy police, inquiring about any records against the Applicant. The Kattankudy police had advised that they did not find any records against the Applicant, nor did they find any record of the message having been issued. The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) refused the Applicant’s claim on credibility grounds, and the RAD dismissed the appeal.
On judicial review, Justice Go found that the Applicant was denied procedural fairness. At the very least, fairness would require the Minister to disclose the documents that CBSA’s request was based on and referred to. The RAD also heightened the procedural fairness breach by failing to address the Applicant’s complaint about the lack of full disclosure. While this breach was grave enough to warrant allowing the judicial review, Justice Go also addressed some of the Applicant’s other arguments as a way of providing guidance when it came to the redetermination. Justice Go found that the RAD engaged in speculation when it came to the motivation of the Sri Lankan authorities and what a “reasonable agent of persecution” would do to pursue their investigation (par. 26). Moreover, Justice Go found that the RAD’s treatment of certain corroborative evidence to be unreasonable. Rather than conducting an independent assessment of the corroborative evidence when it came to credibility of the Applicant’s allegations, the RAD incorrectly relied on the CBSA Declaration and worked backwards from the finding that the Applicant was not being looked for by the police to reject all other evidence. The application for leave was allowed.