Thind v. Canada (MCI), 2022 FC 1644
In Thind v. Canada (MCI), Justice Ahmed assessed an Immigration Officer’s decision to refuse the Applicant’s Temporary Resident Permit (TRP) application on the grounds of lack of unique circumstances to overcome their inadmissibility. On judicial review, Justice Ahmed found the Officer’s decision unreasonable as it failed to properly consider pivotal evidence, resulting in gaps of reasoning. In particular, Justice Ahmed noted that the Officer failed to a) attend to the negligence of the Applicant’s immigration consultant on the file; b) properly assess the difficult travel situation caused by COVID-19; and c) the difficulty the Applicant would face in returning to Canada to be with their spouse- a central reasons for the TRP application. The application for leave and judicial review was allowed.
Humayun v. Canada (MCI), 2022 FC 1640
In Humayun v. Canada (MCI), Justice Brown examined the Refugee Appeal Division’s (RAD) decision to refuse an appeal on the grounds of a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA). On judicial review, the Applicants argued that while the RAD correctly applied the test for determining if a viable IFA existed, it erred in the analysis of the first prong of the test, ignoring and misconstruing evidence before it. On further examination, Justice Brown confirmed that the RAD failed to take into account the NDP evidence for Pakistan, and the UNHCR’s conclusion that a viable IFA was generally not available to individuals targeted to a specific militant group. Justice Brown also argued that the RAD did not reasonably consider that the Applicant were exactly the type of individuals identified at risk by the UNHCR. Justice Brown concluded that the RAD’s risk assessment of the Applicants’ situation regarding the IFA was ultimately unreasonable, failing to take into account the uncontested oral, written and country evidence, and effectively requiring the Applicants to live in hiding. The application for leave and judicial review was allowed.
Badsha v. Canada (MCI), 2022 FC 1634
In Badsha v. Canada (MCI), Justice Ahmed looked at the Immigration Appeal Division’s (IAD) decision to find the Applicant inadmissible to Canada under s. 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act based on their membership of the youth wing of the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party. The Applicant argued that the decision was unreasonable as it assumed that the youth wing was directly connected to the political party and that the group also held the intent to cause death or bodily harm. On Judicial review, Justice Ahmed found that while the IAD’s conclusion on connectedness was reasonable, it was not when it came to the assessment of the intent. Justice Ahmed confirmed that establishing the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury is a higher evidentiary burden than simply establishing knowledge of death or serious bodily injury. The application for leave and judicial review was allowed.
Al-Aswadi v. Canada (MCI), 2022 FC 1623
In Al-Aswadi v. Canada (MCI), Justice Favel assessed an immigration Officer’s decision to refuse the Applicants’ Humanitarian and Compassionate application on the grounds of lack of adverse conditions that would have a “direct negative impact” on the Principal Applicant. Justice Favel found that the Officer erred in their decision by failing to meaningfully engage with the country conditions and limited their assessment of hardship in the Applicant’s home country to hardship connected to personal characteristics. Justice Favel noted that “this error confuses the criteria applicable to an H&C application under subsection 25(1) of IRPA with those that define a person in need of protection under subsection 97(1) of IRPA” (at para. 23). The application for leave and judicial review was allowed.
Nkwo v. Canada (MCI), 2022 FC 1616
In Nkwo v. Canada (MCI), Justice Favel explored the disagreement on the remedies sought with respect to the Applicants’ negative PRRA Decision settlement. The Applicant sought a direct finding of Convention Refugee Status and/or Persons in need or Protection, or having the matter be remitted to a different Officer with the direction that the only remaining issue was the Applicant’s risk of persecution in Cameron as a bisexual woman. The Minister was only willing to submit the matter back for redetermination to a different Officer. On judicial review, Justice Favel found that a direct verdict was not appropriate here as the facts and circumstances in the present case did not point the court to only one reasonable outcome. Furthermore, Justice Favel argued that one Officer’s acceptance of the Principal Applicant’s bisexuality did not mean that a new Officer would find that the Principal Applicant’s bisexuality had been credibly established. Justice Favel concluded that the appropriate remedy in this case was to simply remit the matter for reconsideration to a different Officer.